Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Erkenntnis 78 (5):977-978 (2013)
Abstract
In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jessica Brown (2010). Knowledge and Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
    Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
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