|Abstract||Normally, when we notice a change taking place, our conscious experience has a corresponding quality of phenomenal change . Here it is argued that one’s experience can have this quality at or during a time when there is no change in which phenomenal properties one instantiates. This undermines a number of otherwise forceful arguments against leading metaphysical theories of change, but also requires these theories to construe change as a secondary quality, akin to color.|
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