David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
This is a position paper concerning the role of empirical studies of human default reasoning in the formalization of AI theories of default reasoning. We note that AI motivates its theoretical enterprise by reference to human skill at default reasoning, but that the actual research does not make any use of this sort of information and instead relies on intuitions of individual investigators. We discuss two reasons theorists might not consider human performance relevant to formalizing default reasoning: (a) that intuitions are sufficient to describe a model, and (b) that human performance in this arena is irrelevant to a competence model of the phenomenon. We provide arguments against both these reasons. We then bring forward three further considerations against the use of intuitions in this arena: (a) it leads to an unawareness of predicate ambiguity, (b) it presumes an understanding of ordinary language statements of typicality, and (c) it is similar to discredited views in other fields. We advocate empirical investigation of the range of human phenomena that intuitively embody default reasoning. Gathering such information would provide data with which to generate formal default theories and against which to test the claims of proposed theories. Our position is that such data are the very phenomena that default theories are supposed to explain.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven (2013). Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.
Keith Stenning & Michiel Lambalgen (2005). Semantic Interpretation as Computation in Nonmonotonic Logic: The Real Meaning of the Suppression Task. Cognitive Science 29 (6):919-960.
Francis J. Pelletier, Renée Elio & Philip Hanson (2008). Is Logic All in Our Heads? From Naturalism to Psychologism. Studia Logica 88 (1):3 - 66.
Iyad Rahwan, Mohammed I. Madakkatel, Jean-François Bonnefon, Ruqiyabi N. Awan & Sherief Abdallah (2010). Behavioral Experiments for Assessing the Abstract Argumentation Semantics of Reinstatement. Cognitive Science 34 (8):1483-1502.
Francis J. Pelletier, Renée Elio & Philip Hanson (2008). Is Logic All in Our Heads? From Naturalism to Psychologism. Studia Logica 88 (1):3-66.
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Asher & Alex Lascarides (2011). Reasoning Dynamically About What One Says. Synthese 183 (S1):5-31.
Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Renée Elio (2005). The Case for Psychologism in Default and Inheritance Reasoning. Synthese 146 (1-2):7 - 35.
Joeri Engelfriet & Jan Treur (1998). An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (3):369-388.
Beihai Zhou & Yi Mao (2006). A Base Logic for Default Reasoning. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):688-709.
Gregory Wheeler & Carlos Damasio (2004). An Implementation of Statistical Default Logic. In Jose Alferes & Joao Leite (eds.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA 2004). Springer
Yao-Hua Tan (1997). Is Default Logic a Reinvention of Inductive-Statistical Reasoning? Synthese 110 (3):357-379.
Ariel Cohen, Michael Kaminski & Johann A. Makowsky (2008). Notions of Sameness by Default and Their Application to Anaphora, Vagueness, and Uncertain Reasoning. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (3):285-306.
Gianni Amati, Luigia Carlucci Aiello & Fiora Pirri (1994). Defaults as Restrictions on Classical Hilbert-Style Proofs. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (4):303-326.
Hector Geffner (1992). High-Probabilities, Model-Preference and Default Arguments. Minds and Machines 2 (1):51-70.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #170,136 of 1,790,117 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #140,520 of 1,790,117 )
How can I increase my downloads?