David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 178 (2):177-206 (2011)
In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism (MN) as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself.
|Keywords||Demarcation Intelligent Design Creationism Creation-science Methodological naturalism Science and religion|
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References found in this work BETA
Larry Laudan (1996). Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence. Westview Press.
Elliott Sober (2007). Intelligent Design Theory and the Supernatural—the 'God or Extra-Terrestrials' Reply. Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):72-82.
Barbara Forrest & Paul R. Gross (2003). Creationism's Trojan Horse: The Wedge of Intelligent Design. Oxford University Press Usa.
Citations of this work BETA
Luis Salvador-Carulla, Ana Fernandez, Rosamond Madden, Sue Lukersmith, Ruth Colagiuri, Ghazal Torkfar & Joachim Sturmberg (2014). Framing of Scientific Knowledge as a New Category of Health Care Research. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 20 (6):1045-1055.
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