David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 46 (1):79-85 (1997)
One criticism of David Lewis's account of counterfactuals is that it sometimes assigns the wrong truth-value to a counterfactual when both antecedent and consequent happen to be true. Lewis has suggested a possible remedy to this situation, but commentators have found this to be unsatisfactory. I suggest an alternative solution which involves a modification of Lewis's truth conditions, but which confines itself to the resources already present in his account. This modification involves the device of embedding one counterfactual within another. On the revised set of truth conditions, counterfactuals with true components are sometimes true and sometimes false, in a way that is more in keeping with our intuitive judgments about such statements
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Logic Ontology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
Lee Walters & Robert Williams (2013). An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.
E. J. Coffman (2008). Warrant Without Truth? Synthese 162 (2):173 - 194.
Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland (2013). Safety and the True–True Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.
Similar books and articles
Igal Kvart (2001). The Counterfactual Analysis of Cause. Synthese 127 (3):389 - 427.
Michael McDermott (2007). True Antecedents. Acta Analytica 22 (4):333-335.
Boris Kment (2006). Counterfactuals and Explanation. Mind 115 (458):261-310.
Igal Kvart (1994). Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, True Premises, and Knowledge. Synthese 100 (1):133 - 164.
S. Barker (2003). A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
Lee Walters (2009). Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):365-379.
Jim Bogen (2004). Analysing Causality: The Opposite of Counterfactual is Factual. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):3 – 26.
Seahwa Kim & Cei Maslen (2006). Counterfactuals as Short Stories. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):81 - 117.
Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #113,362 of 1,413,119 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #41,766 of 1,413,119 )
How can I increase my downloads?