David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 29 (2):137-145 (2010)
This essay is a reflection on the idea of truth-making and its applications. I respond to a critique of my 1986 paper on truth-making and discuss some key principles at play in the Truth-maker Program as it has emerged over the past 25 years, paying special attention to negative and general truths. I maintain my opposition to negative and general facts, but give an improved account of how to do without them. In the end, I accept Truth-maker Maximalism and a weakened form of Truth-maker Necessitarianism, reject the assumption that truth-makers must be entities, and urge that the idea of a truth-maker be broadened and loosened so that it applies to anti-realistic as well as realistic truths.
|Keywords||Anti-realism Fact Generality Negation Realism Truth Truth-maker|
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
John Bigelow (1988). The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Damian Cox (1997). The Trouble with Truth-Makers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):45–62.
Frank Hofmann (2006). Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts Ontology. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):409-440.
Citations of this work BETA
Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
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