How to be a normative expressivist

Abstract
Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief.
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1993). Gibbard on Normative Logic. Philosophical Issues 4 (4):60-66.
Simon Blackburn (2002). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):164–176.

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Citations of this work BETA
Heath White (2011). 'Ought': The Correct Intention Account. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):297-317.
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