David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (1):7 – 20 (1997)
It is argued, by use of specific examples, that mathematical understanding is something which cannot be modelled in terms of entirely computational procedures. Our conception of a natural number (a non-negative integer: 0, 1, 2, 3,…) is something which goes beyond any formulation in terms of computational rules. Our ability to perceive the properties of natural numbers depends upon our awareness, and represents just one of the many ways in which awareness provides an essential ingredient to our ability to understand. There is no bar to the quality of understanding being the result of natural selection, but only so long as the physical laws contain a non-computational ingredient.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jaakko Kuorikoski (2011). Simulation and the Sense of Understanding. In Paul Humphreys & Cyrille Imbert (eds.), Models, Simulations, and Representations. Routledge.
Ayca Boylu (2010). How Understanding Makes Knowledge Valuable. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):591-609.
Margaret Catherine Morrison (2006). Scientific Understanding and Mathematical Abstraction. Philosophia 34 (3):337-353.
Glen Pettigrove (2007). Understanding, Excusing, Forgiving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):156–175.
Charles Starkey (2008). Emotion and Full Understanding. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):425 - 454.
Michael Ramscar (2010). Computing Machinery and Understanding. Cognitive Science 34 (6):966-971.
Neil Cooper (1995). The Epistemology of Understanding. Inquiry 38 (3):205 – 215.
Günter Figal (2004). Life as Understanding. Research in Phenomenology 34 (1):20-30.
William J. Rapaport (1988). Syntactic Semantics: Foundations of Computational Natural Language Understanding. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Aspects of AI. Kluwer.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads92 ( #10,029 of 1,004,647 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #28,116 of 1,004,647 )
How can I increase my downloads?