David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 33 (2):215-30 (1990)
A number of philosophers are committed to the view that sense experiences, in so far as they have contents, have propositional contents, but this is more often tacitly accepted than argued for in the literature. This paper explains the propositional account and presents a basic case in support of it in a simple and straightforward way which does not involve commitment to any specific philosophical theory of perception
|Keywords||Metaphysics Perception Proposition Psychology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Jacovides (2010). Do Experiences Represent? Inquiry 53 (1):87-103.
Elizabeth Schier (2007). The Represented Object of Color Experience. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):1 – 27.
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