David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
South African Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):200-218 (2002)
This article defends the view that nonlinguistic animals could be capable of thought (in the sense in which the mere possession of beliefs and desires is sufficient for thought). It is easy to identify flaws in Davidson's arguments for the thesis that thought depends upon language if one is open to the idea that some nonlinguistic animals have beliefs. It is, however, necessary to do more than this if one wishes to engage with the deeper challenge underlying Davidson's reasoning, viz., that of providing a principled account of what it takes for a representer to qualify as a thinker. Heil attempts to construct a Davidsonian account on the basis of the hypothesis that the semantic opacity essential to thought is rooted in second-order representation (which Davidson ties to language), but it can be shown that second-order representation is neither necessary nor sufficient for opacity. A reasonable non-Davidsonian account of thought in terms of which sufficiently sophisticated nonlinguistic animals qualify as thinkers is, however, possible. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(3) 2002: 200-218
|Keywords||Animal Belief Language Thought Davidson, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Hans-Johann Glock (2006). Thought, Language, and Animals. In Michael Kober (ed.), Deepening Our Understanding of Wittgenstein (Grazer Philosophische Studien, Volume 71, 2006). Rodopi. 139-160.
Donald Davidson (1999). The Emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis 51 (1):511-21.
Hans-Johann Glock (2003). Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
Karen Green (2001). Davidson's Derangement: Of the Conceptual Priority of Language. Dialectica 55 (3):239-258.
Diana I. Pérez (2005). Is Thought Without Language Possible? Principia 9 (1-2):177-191.
Daniel Laurier (2004). La Publicité Et l'Interdépendance du Langage Et de la Pensée. Dialogue 43 (2):281-315.
Kristin Andrews (2002). Interpreting Autism: A Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):317-332.
Henry Jackman (2003). Expression, Thought, and Language. Philosophia 31 (1-2):33-54.
John D. Bishop (1980). More Thought on Thought and Talk. Mind 89 (January):1-16.
Roger Fellows (2000). Animal Belief. Philosophy 75 (294):587-599.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?