The explanatory power of local miracle compatibilism

Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266 (2010)
Abstract
Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological principle, arguing that it is not always capable of explaining our inability to do otherwise. In response to this challenge, I point out that this principle is part of a defense against the charge that local miracle compatibilists are committed to outlandish claims. Thus it is not surprising that the principle, by itself, will often fail to explain our inability to do otherwise. I then suggest that in many situations in which we are unable to do otherwise, this can be explained by the compatibilist’s analysis of ability, or his criteria for the truth of ability claims. Thus, the failure of his nomological principle to explain the falsity of certain ability claims is no strike against local miracle compatibilism
Keywords Free will  Determinism  Compatibilism  Local miracle compatibilism  Ability
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (1978). Avoidability and Possible Worlds. Philosophical Studies 33 (4):413 - 421.
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.

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