The Quest for Natural Attitudes within Ontological Limits
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:103-116 (2002)
| Abstract | In “The Natural Ontological Attitude,” Arthur Fine attempts to provide a way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy in philosophy of science. Says Fine, the natural way of treating the ontological status of theoretical entities is not to form speculative metaphysical theories, be they realist or antirealist, but instead is to apply a homely version of Tarskian semantics. I argue that Fine’s position depends on two deficient maxims, and therefore does not provide a compelling way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy. Fine’s Maxim (FM) prohibits the possibility of inferring justified metaphysical theses from the truth-value of existence claims. Hilbert’s Maxim (HM) asserts that metatheoretic arguments are cogent only if they adhere to stricter standards than their constituent theories. I argue that (FM) is likely false, but even if true cannot be rationally believed. I further argue that (HM) is a deficient standard for theory justification due to the problem of infinite regress | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJoseph Rouse (1988). Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:294 - 301.
Dermot Barnes-Holmes (2005). Behavioral Pragmatism Is A-Ontological, Not Antirealist: A Reply to Tonneau. Behavior and Philosophy 33:67 - 79.
Sharon L. Crasnow (2000). How Natural Can Ontology Be? Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.
André Kukla (1994). Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):955-975.
Arthur I. Fine (1984). The Natural Ontological Attitude. In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California Press.
Martin Bunzl (1994). Scientific Abstraction and the Realist Impulse. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):449-456.
Karen Merikangas Darling (2003). Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
Karen Merikangas Darling (2003). Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
Sami Pihlström (1996). Getting Ontologically Natural. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):247-256.
Martin Mahner (1993). What Is a Species? A Contribution to the Never Ending Species Debate in Biology. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 24 (1):103 - 126.
Jamin Asay (forthcoming). Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
E. P. Brandon (1997). California Unnatural: On Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):232-235.
David J. Chalmers (2009). Ontological Anti-Realism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Emily Gill (2012). Defending Quine on Ontological Commitment. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-12-01Total downloads7 ( #133,532 of 549,125 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,125 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
