David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1208-1223 (2008)
The perennial question – What is meaning? – receives many answers. In this paper I present and discuss inferentialism – a recent approach to semantics based on the thesis that to have ( such and such ) a meaning is to be governed by ( such and such ) a cluster of inferential rules . I point out that this thesis presupposes that looking for meaning requires seeing language as a social institution (rather than, say, a psychological reality). I also indicate that this approach may be seen as a new embodiment of the old ideas of structuralism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jaroslav Peregrin (2010). Inferentializing Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):255 - 274.
Similar books and articles
Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2005). Science as a Persuasion Game: An Inferentialist Approach. Episteme 2 (3):189-201.
John MacFarlane (2010). Pragmatism and Inferentialism. In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge 81--95.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2003). Meaning and Inference. In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia
Holger Andreas (2010). New Account of Empirical Claims in Structuralism. Synthese 176 (3):311 - 332.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2006). Meaning as an Inferential Role. Erkenntnis 64 (1):1-35.
Mike Fuller (1996). Puppets and Pebbles and Ripples and Strings: Structuralism and Post-Structuralism Contrasted. Cogito 10 (1):49-55.
Timothy Williamson (2009). Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press 137--159.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2012). Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning. Philosophia 40 (1):75-97.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #90,580 of 1,796,170 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #285,580 of 1,796,170 )
How can I increase my downloads?