Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):70-76 (1999)
|Abstract||This paper rejects Hume's famous claim that we never perceive our selves, by arguing that, under conditions specified, our perception of our bodies is perception of our selves. It takes as its point of departure Quassim Cassam's defence of a position to a similar effect but puts a different interpretation on the distinction between perceiving the body as an object, having spatial attributes, and perceiving it as a self or subject of experiences|
|Keywords||Body Metaphysics Mind Object Subject Cassam, Q Hume|
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