Broadening the mind
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):223-231 (1998)
| Abstract | The main topic of Jerry Fodor’s The Elm and the Expert,1, and the title of the first chapter, is “If Psychological processes are computational, how can psychological laws be intentional?” I focus on the first and second chapters; The first is devoted to setting up the question, the second to answering it | |||||||||
| Keywords | Computation Epistemology Intentionality Psychology Fodor, J | |||||||||
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