Online research in philosophy

: Convinced that logic has a history and that its history always manages to surprise the philosophers, Claude Imbert has devoted much of her work to the study of the Stoic school and of the late-nineteenth-century German logician Gottlob Frege. In the fifth chapter of her book Pour une histoire de la logique, she examines the trajectory of Frege's awareness of what his new logic entails, in particular the way it subverts the project of Kant.

Two claims the present author has made about Frege's philosophy are defended against Michael Dummett's criticisms (The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy and ?Objectivity and Reality in Lotze and Frege?, this journal, 1982). The claim that Frege was concerned primarily with epistemological problems rather than with the theory of meaning, and the claim (this journal, 1978) that the ascription of Wirklichkeit to Thoughts is evidence of Frege's realism, are clarified and defended. Dummett's own characterization of Frege's realism is considered and rejected.

Reakce Petra Koťátka na moji odpověď na jeho kritiku mé knihy (‘Struktura, význam, interpretace’, Filosofický časopis 49, 2001, 509-521) se mi jeví být podstatně věcnější a pro mne stravitelnější než jeho předchozí text; a mám pocit, že teď přece jenom některým jeho výhradám lépe rozumím. To mne vede k tomu, abych se ještě k několika bodům našeho sporu ještě jednou alespoň krátce vrátil; omezím se však již jen na to cco se mi jeví jako skutečně zásadně podstatné a nebudu se již vracet k věcem, o kterých jsem, jak se domnívám, co se dalo, řekl; ani k těm, které se mi zdají být natolik marginální, že by jejich další rozpitvávání na tomto fóru hraničilo s neúctou ke čtenáři.

Unless you are a Frege scholar, or a philosopher of mathematics, if you are familiar at all with Frege’s work, you are most likely familiar with his groundbreaking work in the philosophy of language. You might know that Frege was a mathematician who sought to establish the covertly logical subject matter of arithmetic, a project whose demands drove Frege to his logical investigations and reflections on language. But most likely the connection between Frege’s mathematical research and his philosophy of language remains elusive for you.

This is the first single-volume edition and translation of Frege's philosophical writings to include his seminal papers as well as substantial selections from ...

Frege and Eucken were colleagues in the faculty of philosophy at Jena University for more than 40 years. At times they had close scientific contacts. Eucken promoted Frege's career at the university. A comparison of Eucken's writings between 1878 and 1880 with Frege's writings shows Eucken to have had an important philosophical influence on Frege's philosophical development between 1879 and 1885. In particular the classification of the Begriffsschrift in the tradition of Leibniz is influenced by Eucken. Eucken also influenced Frege's choice of philosophical and logical terms. Finally, there are analogous positions concerning relations between concepts and their expressions in natural language, Frege was probably also influenced by Eucken's use of the term ?tone?. Eucken used Frege's arguments in his own fight against psychologism and empiricism.

This analysis of Frege's views on language metaphysics raised in On Sense Reference, (arguably one of the most important philosophical essays of the past hundred years) provides a thorough introduction to the function/argument analysis. It applies Frege's technique to the central notions of predication, identity, existence and truth, and Bertrand Russell's views throughout serve as a foil to Frege.

Contemporary semantical discussions make mention of the traditional approach to semantics represented by Frege and/or Russell--even sometimes by Frege-Russell. Is there a Frege-Russell view in the philosophy of language? How much of a common semantical perspective did Frege and Russell share? The matter bears exploration. I begin with Frege and Russell on propositions.