Consciousness as computation: A defense of strong AI based on quantum-state functionalism
Graduate studies at Western
In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death and Anti-Death, Volume 4: Twenty Years After De Beauvoir, Thirty Years After Heidegger. Palo Alto: Ria University Press (2006)
|Abstract||This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)|
|Keywords||Artificial Intelligence Chinese Room Consciousness Functionalism Incompleteness Strong Weak Goedel, Kurt|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Larry Hauser (1997). Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.
Roger Penrose (2003). Consciousness, Computation, and the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Dale Jacquette (1990). Fear and Loathing (and Other Intentional States) in Searle's Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.
Don Ross (1995). Minimal Strong Functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:237-268.
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:417-57.
Robert I. Damper (2004). The Chinese Room Argument--Dead but Not yet Buried. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):159-169.
Peter Farleigh (2007). The Ensemble and the Single Mind. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
Georges Rey (2003). Searle's Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?