• Jaroslav Peregrin, Constructions and Concepts.
    Some twenty years ago, semanticists of natural language came to be overwhelmed by the problem of semantic analysis of belief sentences (and sentences reporting other kinds of propositional attitudes): the trouble was that sentences of the shapes X believes that A and X believes that B appeared to be able to have different truth values even in cases when A and B shared the same intension, i.e. were, from the viewpoint of intensional semantics, synonymous 1 . Thus, taking intensional semantics for granted, belief sentences appeared to violate the principle of intersubstitutivity of synonyms. The verdict of the gurus of intensional semantics was that hence intensional semantics is inadequate, or at least insufficient for the purposes of analysis of propositional attitudes; and that we need a kind of a ‘hyperintensional semantics’.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar
    6 downloads  |  Added to index:2009-01-27  |  Mark as duplicate |  Delete from index