David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 118 (2):257-277 (1999)
The Quine/Putnam indispensability approach to the confirmation of mathematical theories in recent times has been the subject of significant criticism. In this paper I explore an alternative to the Quine/Putnam indispensability approach. I begin with a van Fraassen-like distinction between accepting the adequacy of a mathematical theory and believing in the truth of a mathematical theory. Finally, I consider the problem of moving from the adequacy of a mathematical theory to its truth. I argue that the prospects for justifying this move are qualitatively worse in mathematics than they are in science.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Peressini (2008). Confirmational Holism and its Mathematical (W)Holes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):102-111.
Similar books and articles
Anthony Peressini (1997). Troubles with Indispensability: Applying Pure Mathematics in Physical Theoryt. Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):210-227.
Otávio Bueno (2008). Truth and Proof. Manuscrito 31 (1):419-440.
Jacob Busch (2011). Indispensability and Holism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1):47-59.
Mark Colyvan (1999). Contrastive Empiricism and Indispensability. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):323-332.
Richard Pettigrew (2012). Indispensability Arguments and Instrumental Nominalism. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):687-709.
David Liggins (2008). Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
Anthony Peressini (1999). Applying Pure Mathematics. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):13.
Susan Vineberg (1996). Confirmation and the Indispensability of Mathematics to Science. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):263.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #192,297 of 1,410,134 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #177,743 of 1,410,134 )
How can I increase my downloads?