Colours with a Humean face

Philosophia 4 (1):128-144 (2003)
In this article it will be argued that a Humean, projectivist theory of colour can be held consistent and plausible. This can be done without selling out to cognitivist intuitions about colours if the distinction between an everyday and a metalevel is upheld. The distinction, it will be argued, is both natural and philosophically uncomplicated
Keywords Color  Dispositionalism  Epistemology  Projection  Hume
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DOI 10.1515/SATS.2003.128
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Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.

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