Graduate studies at Western
Philosophia 4 (1):128-144 (2003)
|Abstract||In this article it will be argued that a Humean, projectivist theory of colour can be held consistent and plausible. This can be done without selling out to cognitivist intuitions about colours if the distinction between an everyday and a metalevel is upheld. The distinction, it will be argued, is both natural and philosophically uncomplicated|
|Keywords||Color Dispositionalism Epistemology Projection Hume|
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