David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247 (2005)
In _Living Without Free Will_, I develop and argue for a view according to which our being morally responsible would be ruled out if determinism were true, and also if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively events.1 Absent agent causation, indeterministic causal histories are as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are, and a generalization argument from manipulation cases shows that deterministic histories indeed undermine moral responsibility. Agent causation has not been ruled out as a coherent possibility, but it is not credible given our best physical theories. Hence we must take seriously the prospect that we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility. I call the resulting view _hard incompatibilism_. Furthermore, contrary to widespread belief, a conception of life without free will would not at all be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial
|Keywords||Alternative Determinism Ethics Free Will Incompatibilism Intention Moral Responsibility Possibility Frankfurt, Harry|
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Mckenna (2008). A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.
Stephen Kearns (2013). Free Will Agnosticism. Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
Alfred R. Mele (2008). Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):263-286.
Derk Pereboom (2008). A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):160-170.
Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
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