Evading the Slingshot

The topic of this essay is “the slingshot,” a short argument that purports to show that sentences1 designate (stand for, refer to) truth values. Versions of this argument have been used by Frege 2, Church 3, Quine4 and Davidson5; thus it is historically important, even if it immediately strikes one as fishy. The argument turns on two principles, which I call substitution and redistribution. In “Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations,”6 Jon Barwise and I rejected both principles, as part of our attempt..
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    A. C. Genova (2001). How Wittgenstein Escapes the Slingshot. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:1-22.
    Andrew Ward (1986). Barwise, Perry, and Quine's Slingshot Argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):141-146.
    Greg Restall (2004). One Way to Face Facts. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):420–426.

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