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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument

Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118 (2009)
I have presented a Frankfurt-style argument (Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003) against the requirement of robust alternative possibilities for moral responsibility that features an example, Tax Evasion , in which an agent is intuitively morally responsible for a decision, has no robust alternative possibilities, and is clearly not causally determined to make the decision. Here I revise the criterion for robustness in response to suggestions by Dana Nelkin, Jonathan Vance, and Kevin Timpe, and I respond to objections to the argument by Carlos Moya and David Widerker, in the process of which I refine the Tax Evasion example
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References found in this work BETA
J. M. Fischer (2007). In Fischer, Kane Et Al. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub.

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Citations of this work BETA
Tina Talsma (2013). Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.
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