David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 16 (3):222-235 (2003)
In this essay I defend both the individual plausibility and conjoint consistency of two theses. One is the Intentionality Thesis: that all mental states are intentional (object-directed, exhibit ‘aboutness’). The other is the Self-Awareness Thesis: that if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object. I begin by arguing for the individual prima facie plausibility of both theses. I then go on to consider a regress argument to the effect that the two theses are incompatible. I discuss three responses to that argument, and defend one of them.
|Keywords||Intentionality Mental States Metaphysics Regress Self-awareness|
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References found in this work BETA
John Deigh (1994). Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions. Ethics 104 (4):824-54.
Jonardon Ganeri (1999). Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (5):469-483.
Citations of this work BETA
Birgit Kellner (2011). Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):411-426.
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