David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 40 (1):75-97 (2012)
There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any narrow sense for it encompasses a much broader spectrum of approaches to meaning, connected with the Wittgensteinian and especially Sellarsian view of language as an essentially rule-governed enterprise; and indeed I refrain from claiming that the version of inferentialism I present here is in every detail the version developed by Brandom
|Keywords||Meaning Normativity Inferentialism|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Donald Davidson (1974). Belief and the Basis of Meaning. Synthese 27 (July-August):309-323.
Donald Davidson (1999). The Emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis 51 (1):511-21.
L. H. Davis, R. Daw, D. A. Denby, M. Gómez-Torrente, ÅM Wikforss & S. Yalowitz (2001). Alspector-Kelly, M., 93 Alter, T., 345 Ben-Yami, H., 155 Bernstein, M., 329. Philosophical Studies 102 (360).
Christopher Gauker (2007). The Circle of Deference Proves the Normativity of Semantics. Rivista di Estetica 34 (34):181-198.
Citations of this work BETA
Pierre Steiner (2013). The Delocalized Mind. Judgements, Vehicles, and Persons. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2013 (3):1-24.
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