David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 159 (2):253 - 270 (2007)
We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving with images. In support of this argument we review developmental evidence that children's episodic remembering is independent of and emerges after mastery of the false belief task but emerges together with the use of imagery for solving visual rotation tasks
|Keywords||Memory development Episodic memory Remembering Theory of Mind Imagery Introspection|
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Citations of this work BETA
James Russell & Robert Hanna (2012). A Minimalist Approach to the Development of Episodic Memory. Mind and Language 27 (1):29-54.
Christoph Hoerl (2008). On Being Stuck in Time. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):485-500.
Marc Vierhaus, Jana E. Rueth & Arnold Lohaus (2016). Parents’ Perceived Similarity to Their Children, and Parents’ Perspective Taking Efforts: Associations of Cross-Informant Discrepancies with Adolescent Problem Behavior. Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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