David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 85 (1):25 - 54 (1990)
Kant''s claim that the justification of transcendental philosophy is a priori is puzzling because it should be consistent with (1) his general restriction on the justification of knowledge, that intuitions must play a role in the justification of all nondegenerate knowledge, with (2) the implausibility of a priori intuitions being the only ones on which transcendental philosophy is founded, and with (3) his professed view that transcendental philosophy is not analytic. I argue that this puzzle can be solved, that according to Kant transcendental philosophy is justified a priori in the sense that the only empirical information required for its justification can be derived from any possible human experience. Transcendental justification does not rely on any more particular or special observations or experiments. Philip Kitcher''s general account of apriority in Kant captures this aspect of a priori knowledge. Nevertheless, I argue that Kitcher''s account goes wrong in the link it specifies between apriority and certainty.
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References found in this work BETA
Henry E. Allison (2004). Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Yale University Press.
Ermanno Bencivenga (1987). Kant's Copernican Revolution. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Francis Bennett (1966). Kant's Analytic. London, Cambridge U.P..
Rudolf Carnap (1947/1956). Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.
Philip Kitcher (1980). A Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Review 89 (1):3-23.
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