Kant on Transcendental Freedom

Abstract
Transcendental freedom consists in the power of agents to produce actions without being causally determined by antecedent conditions, nor by their natures, in exercising this power. Kant contends that we cannot establish whether we are actually or even possibly free in this sense. He claims only that our conception of being transcendentally free involves no inconsistency, but that as a result the belief that we have this freedom meets a pertinent standard of minimal credibility. For the rest, its justification depends on practical reasons. I argue that this belief satisfies an appropriately revised standard of minimal credibility, but that the practical reasons Kant adduces for it are subject to scrious challenge
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    Johannes Giesinger (2010). Free Will and Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 44 (4):515-528.
    Johannes Giesinger (2011). Kant's Account of Moral Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (7):775-786.
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