David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Vivarium 45 (1):93-112 (2007)
William of Ockham held in his career two different theories about the nature of concepts. According to the first theory, concepts are forged by the mind and "terminate" the mental acts which produce them. This so called "fictum"-theory was abandoned, and Ockham held another theory, according to which concepts are identified with the mental acts themselves. While I think this is a correct description of the evolution of his philosophy, there is one aspect that has gone so far (almost) unnoticed : in his later theory, not only concepts do not terminate mental acts, but nothing seems fit to play this role. Mental acts are no longer "terminated" by anything. Therefore, as the theory of concepts changes, there is also a change in the theory of mental acts. This last change explains the disappearance of the vocabulary associated with the verb "terminare" in the exposition of the mental act theory.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nino Cocchiarella (1998). Reference in Conceptual Realism. Synthese 114 (2):169-202.
Matthew Soteriou (2009). Mental Agency, Conscious Thinking, and Phenomenal Character. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. 231.
Asuncion Alvarez (2006). On Peacocke's Theory of Concepts. In E. Di Nucci & C McHugh (eds.), Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Richard E. Aquila (1976). Intentionality: A Study Of Mental Acts. Penn St University Press.
Susan Brower-Toland (forthcoming). How Chatton Changed Ockham's Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment. In G. Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. Fordham University Press.
Gilbert Ryle (2000). Courses of Action or the Uncatchableness of Mental Acts. Philosophy 75 (3):331-344.
Joëlle Proust (2001). A Plea for Mental Acts. Synthese 129 (1):105-128.
Paul Thagard (2003). Conceptual Change. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2009). The Plurality of Concepts. Synthese 169 (1):145 - 173.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #146,686 of 1,140,133 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #88,260 of 1,140,133 )
How can I increase my downloads?