In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia (2003)
|Abstract||In this paper we first propose an exact definition of the concept of inferential role, and then go on to examine the question whether subscribing to inferentialism necessitates throwing away existing theories of formal semantics, as we know them from logic, or whether these could be somehow accomodated within the inferentialist framework. The conclusion we reach is that it is possible to make an inferentialist sense of even those common semantic theories which are usually considered as incompatible with inferentialism, such as the standard semantics of second-order logic.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jaroslav Peregrin (2008). What is the Logic of Inference? Studia Logica 88 (2):263 - 294.
Timothy Williamson (2009). Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press.
John MacFarlane (2010). Pragmatism and Inferentialism. In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2008). An Inferentialist Approach to Semantics: Time for a New Kind of Structuralism? Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1208-1223.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2006). Meaning as an Inferential Role. Erkenntnis 64 (1):1-35.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2012). Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning. Philosophia 40 (1):75-97.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #49,781 of 722,773 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,773 )
How can I increase my downloads?