On Alfred Mele's free will and luck

Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172 (2007)
I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism
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DOI 10.1080/13869790701305988
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References found in this work BETA
Derk Pereboom (2005). Defending Hard Incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.

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Daniel Haas (2013). Merit, Fit, and Basic Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.

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