Physicalism, Qualia and Mental Concepts

Theoria 17 (2):359-379 (2002)
Abstract
In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism (in terms of the supervenience relation), there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: the explanatory gap argument, and two arguments that Kim mentions against physicalism: the inverted spectrum / zombies argument and the intrinsicality argument. I shall try to show that these three arguments depend upon a misconception of the nature of our ordinary mental concepts
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:405-418.
    A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    Noa Latham (2003). What is Token Physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
    Tim Crane (1995). The Mental Causation Debate (Mental Causation I). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69:211-36.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-03-18

    Total downloads

    5 ( #178,728 of 1,088,388 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,388 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.