Representationalism and the problem of vagueness

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86 (2013)
Abstract
This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism.
Keywords representationalism  perception  intentionalism  content  perceptual content  naive realism  disjunctivism  contents of perception  vagueness  supervaluationism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
    Christopher S. Hill (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.

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