Graduate studies at Western
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):1 - 14 (1978)
|Abstract||I argue for the consistency of frege's treatments of identity and number. Specifically, I argue that geach is wrong in suggesting that frege's insights about number should have led him to the doctrine of relative identity|
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