Rip Van winkle and other characters
European Review of Philosophy 2:13-39 (1996)
|Abstract||In this essay I first review Kaplan’s theory of linguistic character, and then explain and motivate a concept of doxastic character. I then develop some concepts for dealing with the topic of belief retention and then, finally, discuss Rip Van Winkle. I come down on Kaplan’s side with respect to the Frege-inspired strategy, narrowly construed. But I advocate something like the Frege-inspired strategy, if it is construed more broadly. On my view it is remarkably easy to retain a belief, and I think Evans is quite wrong about Rip and Kaplan. The central concept I develop, however, that of an information game, is in the spirit of much of Evans’ work. I also borrow some of his terminology.|
|Keywords||Content Language Sentence Kaplan, D|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Stephen L. White (1982). Partial Character and the Language of Thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (October):347-65.
Josh Dever (2004). Binding Into Character. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):29-80.
Edward N. Zalta (1989). Singular Propositions, Abstract Constituents, and Propositional Attitudes. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press.
Graham Stevens (2009). Utterance at a Distance. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):213 - 221.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). “Mpp, Rip” Rip. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):125-131.
Joao Branquinho (1999). The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics. Grazer Philosophische Studien Grazen 56:2-15.
David Israel & John Perry (1996). Where Monsters Dwell. In Jerry Seligman & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation. Csli Publications, Stanford.
Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #83,218 of 549,694 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,694 )
How can I increase my downloads?