Stalnaker and indexical belief
In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press (2006)
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Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
Desheng Zong (2011). Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):608-623.
Moritz Schulz (2010). The Dynamics of Indexical Belief. Erkenntnis 72 (3).
Stephen R. Schiffer (1986). Stalnaker's Problem of Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April):87-97.
John Perry (1993). The Problem of the Essential Indexical: And Other Essays. Oxford University Press.
Scott Sturgeon (2008). Stalnaker on Sensuous Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):183 - 203.
John Perry (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs 13 (December):3-21.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1981). Indexical Belief. Synthese 49 (1):129-151.
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