Finding out about filling-in: A guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (21):723–802 (1998)
In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a particular neural stage that forms the immediate substrate of perceptual experience enactiveanimatesubpersonal” considerations about internal processing, but rather by considerations about the task of vision at the level of the animal or person interacting with the world
|Keywords||blind spot bridge locus brightness consciousness filling-in Gestalt theory illusory contours isomorphism linking propositions perceptual completion vision|
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Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.
Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Alva Noë (2002). Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual? Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185 - 194.
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