Finding out about filling-in: A guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (21):723–802 (1998)
Abstract
In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a particular neural stage that forms the immediate substrate of perceptual experience enactiveanimatesubpersonal” considerations about internal processing, but rather by considerations about the task of vision at the level of the animal or person interacting with the world
Keywords blind spot   bridge locus   brightness   consciousness   filling-in   Gestalt theory   illusory contours   isomorphism   linking propositions   perceptual completion   vision
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Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
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