David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoria 77 (1):55-70 (2011)
In 1910–11 Axel Hägerström introduced an emotive theory of ethics asserting moral propositions and valuations in general to be neither true nor false. However, it is less well known that he modified his theory in the following year, now making a distinction between what he called primary and secondary valuations. From 1912 onwards, he restricted his emotive theory to primary valuations only, and applied an error theory to secondary ones. According to Hägerström, secondary valuations state that objects have special value properties, that we believe we become acquainted with in primary valuations. But, in fact, we do not have any such acquaintance. There are no, and cannot be any such, properties in objects. What we take to be a property is a projection of a feeling. Therefore, all secondary valuations are false. In 1917 he developed his theory further and distinguished between different types of secondary valuations with different structures. Yet he argued that they all are false. Hägerström's discussion is interesting because, among other reasons, it is historically a very early version of error theory in ethics. In a way it can also be said to be a precursor to later versions, e.g., John Mackie's (1946 and 1977). There are obvious resemblances between their accounts. Mackie's discussion is, of course, independent of Hägerström's
|Keywords||Hägerström Mackie Joyce error theory in ethics Uppsala school emotive theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Axel Hägerström (1964). Philosophy and Religion. London, G. Allen and Unwin.
Richard Joyce (2001). The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press.
John Mackie (1946). A Refutation of Morals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1 & 2):77 – 90.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Enrico Pattaro (2010). I Will Tell You About Axel Hägerström: His Ontology and Theory of Judgment. Ratio Juris 23 (1):123-156.
John Arthur Passmore (1961). Hägerström's Philosophy of Law. Philosophy 36 (137):143 - 160.
Jeremy Butterfield & Chris Isham, A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: IV. Interval Valuations.
Richard Joyce (2011). The Error In 'The Error In The Error Theory'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):519-534.
Bo Petersson (2011). A Real Mind. The Life and Work of Axel Hägerström – By Patricia Mindus. Theoria 77 (1):90-99.
Steven E. Edwards (1987). In Defense of Environmental Economics. Environmental Ethics 9 (1):73-85.
Axel Hägerström (1948). Lectures on so-Called Spiritual Religion. Theoria 14 (1):28-67.
Steffen Borge (2007). Some Remarks on Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities. Acta Analytica 22 (1):74-84.
Bart Streumer (2013). Can We Believe the Error Theory? Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.
David Faraci (2013). Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox. Philosophia 41 (3):751-755.
Einar Tegen (1939). Axel Hägerström 6/9 1868 - 7/7 1939. Theoria 5 (3):229-232.
Axel Hägerström (1935). Begreppet viljeförklaring på privaträttens område. Theoria 1 (1-2):121-138.
John Mizzoni (2010). Evolution and Error Theory. Social Science Information 49 (2):165-194.
Timothy M. Costelloe (2007). So Forward to Imagine. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 10:117-122.
Added to index2011-01-18
Total downloads17 ( #105,410 of 1,140,344 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #140,127 of 1,140,344 )
How can I increase my downloads?