A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle

Episteme 10 (1):19-35 (2013)
Abstract
Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce’s argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in that paper assumed (roughly) that a credence in a proposition is better the closer it is to the objective chance of that proposition. In this paper, I present an epistemic utility argument for Probabilism and the Principal Principle that retains Joyce’s assumption rather than the alternative I endorsed in the earlier paper. I argue that this results in a superior argument for these norms.
Keywords bayesianism   probability   Pettigrew   toread
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Hall (2004). Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
Ned Hall (2004). Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sophie Horowitz (2013). Immoderately Rational. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-16.
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