A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle

Episteme 10 (1):19-35 (2013)
Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce’s argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in that paper assumed (roughly) that a credence in a proposition is better the closer it is to the objective chance of that proposition. In this paper, I present an epistemic utility argument for Probabilism and the Principal Principle that retains Joyce’s assumption rather than the alternative I endorsed in the earlier paper. I argue that this results in a superior argument for these norms.
Keywords bayesianism   probability   Pettigrew   toread
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/epi.2013.5
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,720
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Sophie Horowitz (2014). Immoderately Rational. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.
Ru Ye (2015). Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.
Richard Pettigrew (2016). Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Dylan Dodd (2013). Roger White's Argument Against Imprecise Credences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.
Alexander Pruss & Richard M. Gale (2003). A Response to Almeida and Judisch. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):65-72.
J. T. Roberts (2013). Chance Without Credence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):33-59.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

243 ( #11,637 of 1,937,259 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #41,110 of 1,937,259 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.