David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 107 (3):219-237 (2002)
Arguments for Restrictivism – the position that we are rarely free– have been proposed by incompatibilists Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan among others. This article is concerned much more with these arguments than with quantifying the frequency of free actions. There are two general ways to argue for restrictivism. First, one may take a Negative Strategy, arguing that the situations in which one is not free are common and predominant. Second, one may focus on situations in which one is apparently free, and argue directly that these situations are rare – the Inventory Strategy. I conclude that both types of arguments for restrictivism are unconvincing
|Keywords||Free Will Incompatibilism Metaphysics Restrictivism Van Inwagen, P Vander Laan, D|
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter A. Graham (2008). The Standard Argument for Blame Incompatibilism. Noûs 42 (4):697-726.
Eddy A. Nahmias (2006). Close Calls and the Confident Agent: Free Will, Deliberation, and Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.
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