Are we rarely free? A response to restrictivism

Philosophical Studies 107 (3):219-237 (2002)
Abstract
  Arguments for Restrictivism – the position that we are rarely free– have been proposed by incompatibilists Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan among others. This article is concerned much more with these arguments than with quantifying the frequency of free actions. There are two general ways to argue for restrictivism. First, one may take a Negative Strategy, arguing that the situations in which one is not free are common and predominant. Second, one may focus on situations in which one is apparently free, and argue directly that these situations are rare – the Inventory Strategy. I conclude that both types of arguments for restrictivism are unconvincing
Keywords Free Will  Incompatibilism  Metaphysics  Restrictivism  Van Inwagen, P  Vander Laan, D
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