Backgrounding desire

Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592 (1990)
Abstract
Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in the foreground? We argue, perhaps unsurprisingly, that yes, desire can figure in the background without figuring in the foreground: we call this the strict background view of desire. But we then show, and this is where the surprise comes, that the strict background view of desire has significant implications for contemporary moral philosophy.
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Kieran Setiya (2014). What is a Reason to Act? Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
Christian Miller (2008). Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233 - 255.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.

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