David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):1-18 (2004)
According to an often repeated definition, economics is the science of individual choices and their consequences. The emphasis on choice is often used – implicitly or explicitly – to mark a contrast between markets and the state: While the price mechanism in well-functioning markets preserves freedom of choice and still efficiently coordinates individual actions, the state has to rely to some degree on coercion to coordinate individual actions. Since coercion should not be used arbitrarily, coordination by the state needs to be legitimized by the consent of its citizens. The emphasis in economic theory on freedom of choice in the market sphere suggests that legitimization in the market sphere is “automatic” and that markets can thus avoid the typical legitimization problem of the state. In this paper, I shall question the alleged dichotomy between legitimization in the market and in the state. I shall argue that it is the result of a conflation of choice and consent in economics and show how an independent concept of consent makes the need for legitimization of market transactions visible. Footnotes1 For helpful comments and suggestions I am most grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Alain Marciano, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Thomas Pogge, Hans Bernhard Schmid, to seminar or conference participants in Aix-Marseille, Tutzing, Paris, and Amsterdam, and to two anonymous referees.
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Guido Palazzo & Andreas Georg Scherer (2006). Corporate Legitimacy as Deliberation: A Communicative Framework. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 66 (1):71 - 88.
Guido Palazzo & Andreas Georg Scherer (2006). Corporate Legitimacy as Deliberation: A Communicative Framework. Journal of Business Ethics 66 (1):71-88.
Dominic Martin (2013). The Contained-Rivalry Requirement and a 'Triple Feature' Program for Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 115 (1):167-182.
P. M. Hughes (2009). Constraint, Consent, and Well-Being in Human Kidney Sales. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (6):606-631.
Michael Gonin (2007). Business Research, Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, and the Inherent Responsibility of Scholars. Journal of Academic Ethics 5 (1):33-58.
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