Can functionalism provide the proper basis for a core theory of psychoanalysis?

Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):463-469 (1994)
Before embarking upon the project of reformulating psychoanalysis in the 'scientific' terminology of cognitive science, we should first clearly define what psychoanalysis is about and what it is not about. Cognitive science is based upon a functionalistic philosophy of the mind. As a consequence such a project would require a functionalistic core theory of psychoanalysis. But Freud's claim of the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis, attained through the rendering conscious of what is unconscious or the making personal of what is experienced by the neurotic patient as impersonal, cannot be explained by a functionalistic theory of the mind We examine Freud's claim and conclude that there ought to be a philosophy of qualia at the core of psychoanalysis
Keywords Cognition  Functionalism  Psychoanalysis  Science  Freud
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DOI 10.1080/09515089408573137
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John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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