David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Papers 37 (2):243-261 (2008)
Sometimes it seems intuitively plausible to hold loosely structured sets of individuals morally responsible for failing to act collectively. Virginia Held, Larry May, and Torbj rn T nnsj have all drawn this conclusion from thought experiments concerning small groups, although they apply the conclusion to large-scale omissions as well. On the other hand it is commonly assumed that (collective) agency is a necessary condition for (collective) responsibility. If that is true, then how can we hold sets of people responsible for not having acted collectively? This paper argues that that loosely structured inactive groups sometimes meet this requirement if we employ a weak (but nonetheless non-reductionist) notion of collective agency. This notion can be defended on independent grounds. The resulting position on distribution of responsibility is more restrictive than Held's, May's or T nnsj 's, and this consequence seems intuitively attractive
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References found in this work BETA
Peter F. Strawson (1962). Freedom and Resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48:1-25.
Philip Pettit (2010). Groups with Minds of Their Own. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press
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Virginia Held (1970). Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible? Journal of Philosophy 67 (14):471-481.
Torbjorn Tannsjo (2007). The Myth of Innocence: On Collective Responsibility and Collective Punishment. Philosophical Papers 36 (2):295-314.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael D. Doan (2016). Responsibility for Collective Inaction and the Knowledge Condition. Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):532-554.
Andras Szigeti (2015). Michael E. Bratman: Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1101-1104.
Björn Petersson (2013). Co-Responsibility and Causal Involvement. Philosophia 41 (3):847-866.
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