David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):15-32 (2005)
Why does Sen maintain that people are capable of putting their own goals offline and deliberating and acting out of sheer commitment to others? How can he endorse such a rejection of the belief-desire model of agency? The paper canvasses three explanations and favors one that ascribes an unusual position to Sen: the belief that so far as agents remain in the belief-desire mould, they cannot deliberate on the basis of reasons other than those that derive from standing goals that form an integrated system. What he thinks of as deliberation on the basis of commitment is just the sort of deliberation that involves the formation of a novel, perhaps occasion-specific goal in which the good of another is prioritised.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Anita Kim (2014). The Curious Case of Self‐Interest: Inconsistent Effects and Ambivalence Toward a Widely Accepted Construct. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 44 (1):99-122.
Todd S. Mei (forthcoming). Are Reasons Enough? Sen and Ricoeur on the Idea of Impartiality. Dialogue:1-28.
Similar books and articles
Richard Arneson, Distributive Justice and Basic Capability Equality: 'Good Enough' is Not Good Enough Richard J. Arneson.
T. M. Scanlon (2001). Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 3 Sen and Consequentialism. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):39-50.
Philip Pettit (2009). Neorepublicanism and Sen's Economic, Legal, and Ethical Desiderata. In Reiko Gotoh & Paul Dumouchel (eds.), Against Injustice: The New Economics of Amartya Sen. Cambridge University Press.
Philip Pettit (2009). Freedom in the Spirit of Sen. In Christopher W. Morris (ed.), Amartya Sen. Cambridge University Press.
Brendan Sweetman (2003). Commitment, Justification, and the Rejection of Natural Theology. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (3):417-436.
Philip Pettit (2001). Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 1 Capability and Freedom: A Defence of Sen. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):1-20.
Richard J. Arneson, Distributive Justice and Basic Capability Equality: 'Good Enough' is Not Good Enough.
Douglas Walton (2011). A Dialogue Model of Belief. Argument and Computation 1 (1):23-46.
Herlinde Pauer‐Studer (2006). Identity, Commitment and Morality. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (3):349-369.
Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmid (2005). Symposium on Rationality and Commitment: Introduction. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):1-3.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #113,411 of 1,696,635 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #58,234 of 1,696,635 )
How can I increase my downloads?