Describing one's subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):229-269 (2006)
This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of the descriptions obtained, and then with a brief review of the functions of these descriptions
|Keywords||subjective experience pre-reflective experience pre-reflexive experience consciousness second person first person interview method phenomenology|
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References found in this work BETA
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press.
Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson (1977). Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes. Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
Michael Polanyi (1967). The Tacit Dimension. London, Routledge & K. Paul.
Citations of this work BETA
Simon Høffding & Kristian Martiny (forthcoming). Framing a Phenomenological Interview: What, Why and How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour & Shirley Carter-Thomas (2013). A Gap in Nisbett and Wilson's Findings? A First-Person Access to Our Cognitive Processes. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):654-669.
Evan Thompson (2007). Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
C. Petitmengin, V. NaVarro & M. Levanquyen (2007). Anticipating Seizure: Pre-Reflective Experience at the Center of Neuro-Phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):746-764.
Tom Froese & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2009). Sociality and the Life–Mind Continuity Thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):439-463.
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Joseph K. Schear (2009). Experience and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105.
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