Abstract

This article analyses implementation of freedom of assembly within Lithuania and in some other States of the European Union. Attention is paid to the differences in the implementation practices for this freedom while analysing probability of restriction of freedom of assembly in the light of legal, political and social factors. The article aims to substantiate that the quality of decision while adopting spreading ideas and expressed views during peaceful meetings, or adopting them later, or dismissing in general, is determined by the democratic society being formed in the state during a particular period. On the other hand, although physical restriction of diffusion of ideas while implementing freedom of assembly is legitimate, it should not become the main control tool, since the development of the state in this direction is absolutely opposite to the expansion of democratic ideas in the society. Legal education should become the priority area of the policy conducted by the state. Particularly since this priority provides the security for the spread of best practices in democratic states, thus laying the grounds for effective prevention of expression of illegal behaviour. Such illegal behaviour may occur in the form of incitement of hatred and aggression in respect of persons who have different faith, race, nation or sexual orientation. The article substantiates that the real challenge faced by the modern democracy is security for practical implementation rather than the formal recognition and regulation of rights and freedoms. It has been found in practice that the implementation of freedom of assembly can be faulty restricted by the procedural justice. After evaluating experience of the States of the European Union and the way in which their national legal system is structured, the recommendations are made enabling a timely dispute settlement concerning the right of assembly, i.e., in order to prevent decision making process from becoming an obstacle for the implementation of freedom of assembly. It is pointed out that settlement of the dispute concerning the permission to hold a peaceful assembly after the date of the assembly is pointless and denies social importance of right of the assembly.