David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):361-378 (2004)
This paper presents an axiomatization of the principle of maximizing expected utility that does not rely on the independence axiom or sure-thing principle. Perhaps more importantly the new axiomatization is based on an ex ante approach, instead of the standard ex post approach. An ex post approach utilizes the decision maker's preferences among risky acts for generating a utility and a probability function, whereas in the ex ante approach a set of preferences among potential outcomes are on the input side of the theory and the decision maker's preferences among risky acts on the output side
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bruno Verbeek (2008). Consequentialism and Rational Choice: Lessons From the Allais Paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
Robin Giles (1992). A Generalization of the Theory of Subjective Probability and Expected Utility. Synthese 90 (2):301 - 343.
Cesaltina Pacheco Pires (2002). A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs. Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152.
Teddy Seidenfeld, Extensions of Expected Utility Theory and Some Limitations of Pairwise Comparisons.
Per-erik Malmnäs (1994). Axiomatic Justifications of the Utility Principle: A Formal Investigation. Synthese 99 (2):233 - 249.
Phan H. Giang & Prakash P. Shenoy (2000). A Qualitative Linear Utility Theory for Spohn's Theory of Epistemic Beliefs. In C. Boutilier & M. Goldszmidt (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 16. Morgan Kaufmann.
Jeffrey Helzner (2008). Expected Content. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):424-432.
Martin Peterson (2011). A New Twist to the St. Petersburg Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 108 (12):697-699.
Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark Schervish & Joseph Kadane, When Coherent Preferences May Not Preserve Indifference Between Equivalent Random Variables: A Price for Unbounded Utilities.
Robin Pope (2000). Reconciliation with the Utility of Chance by Elaborated Outcomes Destroys the Axiomatic Basis of Expected Utility Theory. Theory and Decision 49 (3):223-234.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #129,339 of 1,410,463 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #57,804 of 1,410,463 )
How can I increase my downloads?