Is procedure instrumental?
| Abstract | Clearly procedure plays some important role in accounts of legal authority, a concept that depends on the possibility of obedience to substantively disagreeable legal commands. But is the role of procedure intrinsic - commanding obedience without regard to the outcomes it produces - or instrumental? On an epistemic-guidance account of legal authority (like Joseph Raz's service conception), the instrumental nature of procedure is obvious: Legal procedures confer authority by generating better outcomes than legal subjects could achieve on their own. On a broadly Hobbesian dispute-resolving account, however, procedure appears to have entirely intrinsic value, as a focus on outcomes seemingly would recapitulate whatever dispute law is supposed to resolve. This paper contends that, despite this impression, procedure can in fact be instrumental on a dispute-resolving account of legal authority, albeit on a systemic rather than an ad hoc basis - a possibility with potentially important consequences for the legitimacy of legal procedures. | |||||||||
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Corey Brettschneider (2005). Balancing Procedures and Outcomes Within Democratic Theory: Corey Values and Judicial Review. Political Studies 53:423-451.
Scott Hershovitz (2011). The Role of Authority. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (7).
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Enzo Rossi (2009). The Exemption That Confirms the Rule: Reflections on Proceduralism and the Uk Hybrid Embryos Controversy. Res Publica 15 (3):237-250.
Joseph Raz (1979). The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford University Press.
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Roger A. Shiner (1992). Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought. Oxford University Press.
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