Is the “Core Self” a Construct? Review of “Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective” by Dan Zahavi

Constructivist Foundations 6 (2):270-274 (2011)
Abstract Upshot: Is lived experience always the experience of a self? The central thesis of Dan Zahavi’s book is that there is a “minimal” or “core” self, according to which a quality of “self-givenness” is a constitutive feature of experience. The adoption of a dynamic phenomenological perspective leads us to call this thesis into question
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    Joseph K. Schear (2009). Experience and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105.
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